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DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of Mason County, .Kentucky,April, 1858.
Wr.

A.

GRAHAM AND ELIZA H. KNOX VS. THE CITY OF
ALEXANDER MADDOX AND OTHERS.

MAYSVILLE,

1. The Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company was chartered on the 4th of
March, 1850; by the terms of the charter, the city of Maysville was authorized
to subscribe stock, and to become a stockholder to the amount of $150,000; and
the charter further provided, that it should be lawful for the city to raise the
amount of subscription by a tax on the real and personal estate of the said city,
or by borrowing the amount, and made the sum so borrowed or raised by tax,
payable in the way and on the terms deemed most ddvisable by the mayor, &o.;
and also made provision for the payment of the interest on the amounts borrowed.
It further provided, that all taxes laid to pay either the principal or interest,
should be pledged and appropriated to that purpose, and to no other. By virtue
of this law an election was held, and the vote resulted unanimously in favor of
the subscription of $150,000 by the city, and it was accordingly made, and the
city became the chief stockholder of the said railroad, and started and controlled
its organization, and the election of its officers. By reason of this subscription,
and by the efforts of the citizens of Maysville, the counties of Mason, Benton,
and Fayette, voted for and took large subscriptions of stock, as well as the individual citizens residing in those counties. On the 17th of February, 1851, the
legislature amended the company's charter, and authorized the cities and counties that should subscribe under the original act, to execute bonds payable to the
president and directors of the company, and authorized and required the county
courts and city councils to levy and collect an amount in money, upon the real
and personal property of said cities and counties, sufficient, annually, to pay off
the interest on said bonds, and pointed out the mode of levy and collection. The
city council of Maysville, under this amendment, ordered one hundred and fifty
bonds, for $1000 each, to be executed by the president of the city council, under
the seal of the city, and issued them to the railroad company, who accepted
them in consideration of twenty shares of the capital stock of the company for
each bond. The plaintiffs became, in good faith, holders of these bonds, and the
interest upon them was regularly paid until July, 1857; held, that notwithstanding there might have been some technical or formal non-compliance with the provisions of acts, there was a substantial compliance, and that it was the duty of
the authorities of Maysville to make provision for the regular payment of the
interest on these bonds, and the ultimate redemption of principal.
2. The facts, that the calculations made by the advocates of the road, had proved
delusive and erroneous, that the road cost more than was anticipated, and had
failed before its completion, are no evidence of fraud, and cannot avail against
an innocent bondholder for value.
3. The true interpretation of the charter under which this subscription was made,
is that the city council of Maysville was to appoint the time and give notice of
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the vote, and make the subscription; and this has been done. The duty of the
mayor was ministerial; the power of the vote controlled him, and after the vote,
the mayor and the council must subscribe.
4. That the bonds are made payable to the laysville and Lexington railroad
instead of to the president and directors of the said company, is an objection of
mere form, and without substance.
6. Where the company's charter provided that the interest should be due yearly, it
is no violation of it that the interest is made payable semi-annually instead of
annually.
6. Every objection which would have sustained an injunction before the negotiation
of these bonds, cannot avail, after their negotiation, against a bona fide holder or
innocent purchaser for value.
7. Where the legislature made it the duty of the city council to levy and collect a
tax for a specified purpose, such direction is mandatory, and it becomes the duty
of the city to levy such tax, which duty may be enforced by mandamus.

This was an application for a mandamus, upon the part of the
plaintiffs, holding certain bonds of the City of Maysville, issued in
part for its subscription to the capital stock of the Maysville and
Lexington Railroad Company, to compel the City Council to levy
and collect a tax to pay the instalments of interest due and in
arrears upon said bonds, &c.; and the case having been elaborately argued upon a former day, the opinion of the court was
rendered on the 29th day of April, by
PHISTER, J.-William A. Graham, claiming to be the holder and
owner of six of the bonds of one thousand dollars each, executed by
the city of Maysville to the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company, in payment of its subscription of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars to the capital stock of said company, and Eliza H.
Knox, claiming to be the holder and owner of five of said bonds,
unite in a petition and motion, to which the city of Maysville and
the individual members of its Board of Councilmen are made parties,
praying for a writ of mandamus against the Board of Councilmen
of said city, to require them to levy and collect for the year 1857 a
tax upon the real and personal property of said city in conformity
with the charter and amended charters of said railroad company,
to pay the interest due on said bonds for the year 1857, "and to
pay plaintiffs the instalment of interest due on their bonds on the
1st day of July 1857." The petition was filed on the 26th day of
October, 1857-and notice of the motion was given for the 29th
day of the October term, being the 6th day of November, 1857.
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On the 29th day of the term, the defendants appeared to the
motion, and presented various reasons why they had been unable
to prepare themselves properly to defend it-and the court, deeming their reasons satisfactory, and believing that there would not be
time enough before the adjournment of the term, which was bound
by law to take place on the next day, to hear said motion consistently with the performance of such other business as was essential
to be done before the close of the term, granted to defendants a continuance of said cause. The court suggested at the same time that
it would be agreeable to the judge, if the parties would consent, to
hear said motion at the special term so soon as the fall series of
courts was over; that the issues involved were of great importance
and that it would be more satisfactory to all concerned to have the
hearing when the court and attorneys would not be disturbed with
other business and would be free to devote their undivided attention
to the investigation and decision of the grave questions which would
arise in this proceeding. This led to an agreement which was entered of record that the case should be tried at a special term, to be
held on the 22d day of December, 1857, and thereupon a term was
called by the judge for that purpose to be held on that day. It was
afterwards discovered that, owing to some mistake in the calculation of time, said term would conflict with a regular term of the
Circuit Court to be held by the judge in another county-and the
Court observed in the answer of defendants (which in the meantime
had been published) that they objected to the trial of the motion at
a special term. This was regarded by the court as doing away
with the efficacy of the previous agreement. For the motion was a
common law proceeding, and there being no power vested in the
Court to call a term for the trial of any other than "chancery, criminal or penal causes," consent alone could render such a hearing
valid, and it is more than probable that the validity would consist
in the failure of either party to take advantage of the irregularity.
For these reasons the special term was not held, and the motion
necessarily passed over to the present April term. In the meantime a regular election had been held under the charter of said city
on the 1st Monday in January, 1858, for a Board of Councilmen
and other city officers, and some of the oonncilmen have been
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changed. Hon. R. H. Stanton, John Skackleford and H. Taylor,
who were councilmen of the previous year, and in favor of the levy
and collection of the tax were defeated. Joseph Frank, who voted
-with them for the tax, was not a candidate for re-election. Those
of the old members who opposed the tax and were candidates for reelection succeeded, and with the new members compose a unanimous
council in opposition to the levy and collection of this tax, who have
been elected by a large majority.
An amended petition was filed by the plaintiffs at a proper time
before this term, suggesting the foregoing facts, making the newly
elected members of the council parties, and praying for a mandamus as before, with the addition of a prayer for a levy to be required to pay the interest for the 1st of January, 1858, then past
due. Another notice of the motion for a mandamus was regularly
given to the members of the council for the present year, and, the
matter has come fully up for trial at this term. Various demurrers
have been filed, and motions made by each party. But the case
was submitted to the court and heard, under the agreement that
these demurrers and motions, which involved, more or less, the merits
of the whole case and the objections to testimony, which were of the
same character, should be passed upon by the court in its final decision.
The court would greatly have preferred the trial of this case at a
special term, if it had been possible, because of its inability amid
the multiplicity and constant press of engagements at a regular
term, to devote such continuous and unembarrassed attention to it
as is necessary. But as this could not be done, the court will proceed as briefly as practicable to decide it now.
The Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company was chartered
on the 4th of March, 1850. The charter authorized in express
terms, the city of Maysville to subscribe stock to, and become a
stockholder in, said company to the amount of one hundred and
fifty thousand dollars, upon certain conditions therein stated.
And it provided "that it shall be lawful for said city (and the
other cities and counties mentioned therein) so authorizing subscriptions to the capital stock of said company, to raise the amount of
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their separate subscriptions, as the same shall be called by the President and directors of said road, by a tax on the real and personal
estate of the said several cities and counties subscribing, or by borrowing the amount thereof, payable in the way and on the terms
the said several Mayors and Councils and the said several county
courts may deem most advisable; and the interest on all such sums
borrowed may be provided for in such manner as to them seems
best: Provided, that all taxes laid by any city or county to pay
the principal and interest (or either) of the amounts borrowed by
them, shall be pledged and sacredly appropriated to such purpose
and no other "-and it allowed citizens stock for their taxes paid.
Under and according to this charter the City Coun6ll of Maysville, after due notice in the newspapers printed in said city and by
handbills (which last mode of notice was not required by the charter), caused a poll to be opened in the three wards of the city, and
the sense of the voters of said city taken, as to the propriety of said
city subscribing said amount of $150,000 to the capital stock of
said railroad company, as provided in said charter. This vote
resulted unanimously in favor of sail subscription-everyvote cast
being for it. On the 28d day of April, 1850, the returns of said
vote were made to said council, and were duly examined; and
thereupon, in conformity with their duty under said charter, they,
by an order entered of record, "instructed the President of the
Council to subscribe said $150,000 of stock in the books opened for
subscription to said company's capital stock."
On the 24th day of April, 1850, this subscription was made by
the President of the Council in the books opened by the Commissioners appointed by law for that purpose, and the same was accepted by them. Thereafter, with the stock thus taken, and only 63
shares, or $3,150 of individual stock, the said railroad company was
organized according to the provisions of the charter, and its officers
duly elected. The city of Maysville thus constituted its chief stockholder, and started and controlled its organization and the election
of its officers.
A very zealous feeling grew up in favor of the road. The said
subscription of the city of Maysville was considered the basis of a
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hope for the success of the enterprize, which was regarded as of
great importance by its citizens, and the citizens generally were
active in their efforts to promote it. They subscribed liberally to
the stock as individuals, and were earnest and constant in their
labors to induce others to subscribe. They made regular canvasses
through Mason and other counties along the route of the road, and
in the city of Lexington, its southern terminus, to influence them to
take the amount of stock permitted to them by the charter of the
Company. And from the proof it may be said that it was chiefly,
if not almost entirely owing to this foundation subscription of the
city of Maysville, and the persevering and systematic efforts of its
citizens, that the counties of Mason, Bourbon and Fayette voted for
and took their large subscriptions of stock in the company. A very
considerable amount of individual stock was also obtained in those
counties by the same influences.
On the 17 th day of February, 1851, after the subscription by the
Mason county court of $150,000, the Legislature, by an amendment to the charter, authorized "the county court of any county,
or city council of any city, who shall subscribe stock in said company, under the provisions of the original act, to execute bonds of
the county or city, payable to the President and Directors of said
company, for the amounts severally subscribed by said countie's and
cities, payalble at such times as may be deemed best by said
county courts and city councils "-and authorized and required
them, "severally, to levy and collect upon the real and personal
property of said counties or cities, an amount in money, sufficient
annually to pay off the interest on said bonds." It pointed out the
mode of levy and collection, and enacted that the bonds authorized
to be executed should be negotiable and transferable, &c., &c.
The City Council of the city of Maysville, availing itself of this
amendment, (as did the counties of Mason, Bourbon and Fayette)
proceeded, as the city authorities mnight have done under the original charter, and by resolutions or orders, entered of record on its
journals, ordered one hundred and fifty bonds of the city of Maysville, of the amount of $1,000 each, to be executed by the President
of the City Council and countersigned by the City Clerk, under the
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seal of the city, to the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company
for the said subscription. The same were so issued, and were
received by the railroad company in payment of the stock subscribed
by the city. The bonds themselves show that they were each executed "in considerationof twenty shares of the capitalstock of said
company, subscribed upon their books by said city," which concludes
the city giving the bonds and the railroad company accepting them,
as to the fact of the subscription.
The said bonds were executed, as appears from the proof, with
the knowledge on the part of the city and citizens that they were
to be negotiated and sold by the railroad company, for the purpose
of raising the money with which to build the road. That was the
well known object of their execution-the charter was amended for
this purpose. Their character and credit were praised by the citizens and city papers of Maysville, and endorsements of them by
distinguished citizens of the State, including the Attorney General,
were published and sent broadcast over the land. These recommendations were obtained by the company, of which the city of
Maysville and her citizens were the leading and "controlling elements. The citizens were the originators of the enterprise, its
ardent and effective friends, and Maysville was its recognized basis,
and its directors, with one or two exceptions, resided there. The
bonds were negotiated and transferred in the commercial or stock
markets of the Union, and their sale was published from time to
time as having been made upon advantageous terms.
During all this time, it seems that no authority of the city, nor
any citizen, all of whom were well apprised of these proceedings,
ever made any objections to them, or even suggested any question
as to the legality or validity of these bonds. But there was a
united feeling in favor of the subscription and this mode of paying
for it.
The city received the stock, becam( an important and influential
stockholder in the compapy, and was recognized as such by the
other stockholders.
Under these circumstances, and after such conduct on the part of
the city of Maysville, its authorities and citizens, the plaintiffs, it

'596

GRAHAM ET AL. vs. MADDOX ET AL.

seems, became, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, the
purchasers and holders of the bonds filed. Taxes have been regularly levied and collected to pay the interest on all of said bonds,
from the time of their issue till July, 1857, their validity being thus
further recognized by the authorities of the city who levied the tax,
and by the citizens who paid it and elected such officers.
The plaintiffs now come into court and ask such relief as the
laws of the country will give them, for the enforcement of their
rights in the premises. Taking this general view of the history of
this railroad, and the connection of the city and citizens of MNaysville therewith, and the facts attending the execution and transfer
of the bonds, it would seem that the highest sanctions of law and
justice require, that they, with their interest, should be promptly
and fully paid. Had an individual thus taken stock in the company, and by his example and zealous efforts, induced others to do
the same, and paid for his subscription by the execution of his
notes for the purpose of being sold, received his stock therefor, and
the company had accepted his notes as payment of his stock and
recognized him as a stockholder, and he had used his influence as
such, and his said notes had been transferred with his knowledge
and approbation, to purchasers in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, ignorant of any thing prejudicial to them, it is' clear
that no principle of law or equity would permit him afterwards to
avoid their payment. Can there be any such' difference between an
incorporated city and an individual, as will authorize her, and thus
furnish her with the temptation, to refuse the payment of debts
contracted under such circumstances as would inevitably bind an
individual ?
There is a well recognized difference in law between an individual
and a corporation. An individual in contracting, acts from the
promptings of his own will, and by virtue of his rights as a natural
person, independently of any investure of power by the law. A
corporation is the creature of the law, and derives its powers from
the law, and must act in conformity with the law. It is usually
composed of many individuals, who are distinct from the legal
entity called a corporation, and the rights of each of whom may be
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distinct from those of the corporation of whose essence they form
a part. A city is a corporation, so called; (though it is in fact
more properly a portion of the government of the country, having
powers of legislation and other governmental functions delegated to
it by the legislative authority of the Commonwealth, over persons
and property within its prescribed boundaries.) Edt while these
distinctions are well defined in the law and are acknowledged by
the court, the inquiry arises, can a corporation claim immunity
from the ordinary rules of right and justice, which constitute the
basis of law, and which its provisions are intended to establish and
promote ? Are the provisions of the statute organizing it, intended,
or so arranged, as that they can be used as means by which it may
impose upon the rights of others ? Can it do an act to-day imposing an obligation on itself for substantial benefits conferred, and
repudiate the obligation to-morrow, after the receipt of the consideration, because it has not acted in literal though in substantial compliance with the law? Is there any such mysterious and potent
significance in the relations between an incorporated city and its
constituent members, the citizens, that it can act for them, in their
name, and under their unanimous instruction, in incurring a debt as
a consideration for great and important rights received, and then,
after the consideration is obtained, fall back on the legal principle
that the city and its citizens are distinct, and throw off the burthen
in their name and by their authority, upon some technical, formal,
ministerial objection, or because it is regarded as inconvenient or
onerous?
These are questions which are suggested by the main defence
relied on in this case ; and while the court recognizes the duty of
an incorporated city to act within its charter, and the right which
belongs to it or its constituent members, under proper circumstances,
to treat acts done without the authority of its charter, as invalid,
yet this principle of law will not justify a court in releasing a city,
or its citizens, from the obligation of a debt fairly incurred for an
honest consideration, unless there is something more than mere
technicalities which demand it. There must be serious objections
of law, those of substance, or thp just demands of creditors should
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prevail. Oases have occurred, and can be readily conceived, wherein
the courts, on the proper application of citizens, would prevent the
authorities of a city from instituting or carrying on a certain proceeding, on account of some objections of form; and yet after it
had been accomplished by the assistance or encouragement of the
citizens, and he rights of innocent third parties had become involved,
would not consider it invalid, for the reason that to do so would be
to sanction a wrong.
With these general views, the court is satisfied that it is the duty
of the proper authorities of the city of Maysville to make provision for the regular payment of the interest and the ultimate redemption of the principal of this debt. The plaintiffs and other holders
of the bonds have a right to demand it, unless there is some insuperable objection in the constitution or laws of the country ; or
unless the facts proved by defendants nullify the actual or legal
merits of the claim. If they have such right, it is the boast of our
laws that they must have a remedy, and the remedy must be firmly
administered by the court, unless plaintiffs have made some fatal
mistake in its selection as applicable to the case.
This brings us to a consideration of the objections to the validity
of this debt, the legality of the tax, and to the remedy resorted to
by plaintiffs for the enforcement of their rights. There are a number of them presented in the written pleadings, and also in the oral
arguments, and they embrace every conceivable idea which can be
deduced from the law or facts of the case. Such is their multiplicity and variety, that the court may feel itself excused from giving
any lengthened consideration to others than those which seem to present fair ground for avoiding this debt.
The defendants aver, that the original and amended charters of
the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company were unconstitutional, both by the old and new constitutions of Kentucky: and
that therefore these bonds issued under said charter and amendments, are inoperative and void. This question has been settled
by the decision of our Appellate Court, in the case of Slack and
others against the Maysville and -Lexington Railroad Company,
18th B. Monroe, page 1. That was an action instituted for the
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very purpose of testing the constitutional validity of these charters,
and the debt contracted by Mason county under them, for its subscription of stock to the company, and the tax levied to pay the
interest thereon. As there was a dissenting Justice, and the case
was one of great magnitude and interest, it may be inferred, that
the majority of the court were, if possible, more thorough and careful in their investigations than usual in making up their opinions.
Their decision discloses within itself, that they had in view and
duly weighed every consideration, great as well as minute, which
defefidants have suggested as objections to the constitutionality of
said charter and amendment, and when taken in connection with
the able and elaborate opinion of the dissenting Justice it is plain
that the Appellate Court intended to, and did, endorse fully the
constitutionality of said charters, and the proceedings of the Railroad Company and the County Court of Mason, in reference to the
debt and tax under them. They not only discussed and decided
the great constitutional question arising from such legislation, but
they noticed details as well as principles, and overruled objections
as to the alterations contained in the amended charter, as to stock
of taxpayers, interest, its time, mode and place of payment, &c.
There is no substantial difference between the action of the
Mason County Court, whose proceedings were directly under review
in that case, and the action of the City Council of the City of
Maysville in reference to the same matters; which latter is now
the subject of investigation. There was an order for a vote, an
election, order for subscription-subscription, order for the issue of
bonds and their issue, of the same character and terms of payments,
and levy of tax in each case. It does not become the court to discuss the policy of such an adjudication, or to go behind it and
inquire into its abstract correctness, or to institute comparisons
between it and the dissenting opinion. It is sufficient for the court
that it contains the law of the land as expounded by its highest
judicial tribunal, and all inferior courts, authorities and individuals,
must pay obedience to it until it is abrogated by the same power
which established it. It seems to have followed the train of previous adjudications, and has been subsequently relied on as autho-
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rity. The court must therefore disregard the constitutional objection in all its aspects, raised by defendants.
This decision was rendered'in January, 1852. These bonds were
not negotiated and transferred until August thereafter, and it was
published by the company, as one of the means to give credit to
the bonds in the markets of the world-and was referred to by
those recommending them as good investments. Doubtless, plaintiffs were influenced by it in the purchase of the bonds filed.
Unless there is some such essential difference in the circumstances
of the execution of the two sets of bonds, as would make the legal
character of them materially different, (as we believe there is not,)
it would not require much argument to show, that even the judiciary
of the State would be justly liable to the charge of bad faith, if the
bonds and tax were decided constitutional and binding before the
transfer of the bonds; and after their transfer and the payment of
the consideration by the purchasers, in good faith relying upon such
adjudication, and when the railroad company had disastrously failed,
and all hope of an efficacious recourse was gone, the decision should
be altered, and they should be pronounced unconstitutional or
invalid.
The third and thirteenth objections set up by defendants, are, in
effect, that the subscription of the city to the stock of the railroad
company was obtained by fraud-that the citizens were induced to
vote the subscription, and the Council to make it and issue the
bonds, upon the express pledge and understanding, that the city
would be required only to pay the accruing interest on the bonds
for three years from their date, and that after that period, the railroad company would itself provide for the payment of the accruing
interest and the principal of said bonds, as the same should become
due-and that these pledges have been falsified, that the money
has been foolishly squandered and applied in such a way as to be
totally useless to the city, and that the tax is now onerous and
oppressive.
There was an attempt to prove that such pledges were made.
But the proof varied from the allegations. It appears that there
was a very decided and enthusiastic feeling in favor of the subscrip-
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tion of the stock by the city, and little or no argument or persuasion was necessary to induce any of the citizens to vote for itthey supported the project with perfect unanimity. It cannot
therefore be said that the "actual payers of the debt, the people,
had little or no agency in its creation." There could have been no
subscription, no bonds and no tax, but for their vote, and that was
unanimous. It is not very certainly proven, that any considerations of the character alleged were presented to the people previous
to the vote of the city for the subscription of stock. But if such
considerations were held out before that time, they were not presented as pledges, or by any one authorized to speak for the company. The company was not then in existence-the stock commissioners are not involved by the pleadings or proof in this charge
of bad faith-and any suggestions of the kind alluded to, were
merely arguments used by persons advocating the project, to secure
the subscription. There were calculations made by individuals in
private circles, and by public speakers, in supporting the system,
to the effect that the road would be three years in course of construction, and that when completed, it would commence paying to
each stockholder, (the city included,) such dividends on the stock
as would equal the interest on the loan, and that gradually, the
dividends would so increase over the interest, as to redeem the
principal at its maturity. These were deductions drawn from the
cost of constructing the road, and its probable business, looking to
the country through which it would pass, its important termini,
connections, &c. But whether these calculations arose from the
dreams of over confident advocates of the project, or were well
matured deductions of men of science and judgment from proper
premises, they were not put forth in the form of pledges, or received
as such; and if the citizens or authorities acted upon them, it was
not with the reliance of contracting parties, taking a pledge or warranty, but with a belief, formed doubtless, after what they considered due deliberation, that such arguments were well founded,
and the persuasions drawn therefrom were sufficient inducements
for the important step which was proposed.
As before remarked, it is not clear from the proof, that even such
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arguments and persuasions were held out to the citizens by any one
of authority, previous to the vote of Maysville ; but they were
afterwards extensively used by the citizens of Maysville to induce
the people of the county, and other counties, to follow Maysville in
the subscription she had made. The fact that these calculations
were delusive and have proven erroneous, that the road cost more
than was anticipated, that it has been an unfortunate experiment,
and failed before completion, that the expenditure has been useless,
and that thus the enthusiastic hopes cherished by Maysville and
her citizens for the success of the undertaking, and as to the many
advantages to be derived from it, have been blasted, may excite the
goodly feeling of the-country in behalf of a noble little city so sadly
disappointed, and serve to temper the indignation of the plaintiffs
and other like creditors, at the delay in receiving their instalments ;
but they can constitute no excuse for a court of justice in refusing
to coerce a debt thus contracted. These bondholders were no parties to these arguments or persuasions. They bought the obligations of the city for a valuable consideration, ignorant of the causes
which led to the subscription, upon the faith of the laws under which
they were issued, the honor of Kentucky, and the credit and resources
of the city- and the idea cannot be entertained for a moment,
however unfortunate the matter may be, that because the citizens
of Maysville made a miscalculation in reasoning together as to the
policy of the subscription, their debt contracted in making it should
not be paid. Indeed, the explanation now made by the city, of the
means by which the subscription was obtained, shows conclusively,
that it was in contemplation by her and her citizens, at the time the
subscription was voted, for it to be paid by the issue of bonds, and
that they were then making calculations as to the interest. That
such bonds as were then in contemplation were subsequently issued,
should not now, after the event, be objected to.
Neither can it be an available legal objection to the payment of
these bonds and their interest, that the money was squandered, or
that the enterprise has resulted disastrously, and that the unforseen
result has depreciated the value of property, and that the tax is
now onerous. The proof and pleadings show that the management
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of the railroad was entrusted to gentlemen of enlarged and liberal
views, who were a portion of the most prominent and enterprising
citizens of Maysville, and a number of them were members of its
council. It is to be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that they acted from correct motives andwithan enlightened,
or at least, sincere regard for the best interests of the road, its stockholders, and the counties, and the city of Maysville, who were its
largest stockholders. It may be, that from lack of experience, or
practical experience with the business of building a railroad, they
were imposed upon, or erred in many particulars. But that cannot
invalidate the subscription of the bonds issued to pay for it. The
city was the largest stockholder, and controlled entirely in the election of the first directory, who mainly continued till the failure
of the company. The president of her city council was the first
president of the road. They were officers selected by her, and she
cannot now justly complain of their acts to the detriment of innocent third parties.
The disastrous result of this railroad enterprise will cause all men
of right feeling to sympathize with the despondency of those who
participated in it, and whose bright visions of success have turned
to gloom. But no individual could be excused from the payment
of a debt because the business in which he had embarked his borrowed money, had proved a failure. And a corporation can have
no immunity, in this respect, above an individual. The world is
full of people involved in debt by reason of miscalculations, or misfortunes in business. Courts are every day compelled to enforce
the judgments of the law against those who are unwilling or unable
to pay their debts. It is one of the certain penances for indebtedness, contracted in profligacy or thoughtlessness, or it may be with
good motives and apparently well-grounded hopes of success, that
the party indebted must, in case of adversity, practice prudence
and economy, and wearily, but patiently toil through years of penury,
to extinguish it. And if Maysville excited the admiration of her
State and the country, by the zeal and industry of her citizens in
behalf of this project, how much higher will be the tribute of their
praise, and how much nobler will be the influence of her example,
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if she and her citizens should in the midst of losses and troubles,
proceed with hopeful and determined effort to extingnish this debt,
now that she can realize none of the expected fruits from it, but
must receive her reward in the approbation of good men, and the
consoling consciousness of redeeming obligations honestly contracted. It may be a matter of profound regret, that the burthen
of paying this corporation debt falls upon the property of individual citizens, (though in the form of a tax,) with the weight of a
personal obligation; yet this was the mode pointed out by the
charter to meet the liability, and the people having imposed it upon
themselves, the consequences cannot be avoided. I have thus met
this objection more.at length than the mere law of the case requires,
because as one whose interests are embarked in the community,
whose relatives, friends, and neighbors are to be affected in their
fortunes by this proceeding, I have felt that, after the flush of disappointment is over, the people can and should lay the foundation
of a system, which, tith foresight and prudent management, will
extinguish this debt. If they cannot now see their way clear to
such a result, it is their duty to pay as long as it is possible, from a
pure sense of rectitude. In the progress of events and with brighter
times, better fortunes may await them.
Under their 7th head, the defendants aver that the city of Maysville executed to the Maysville and Lexington Railroad, bonds
to the amount of $180,000, which were numbered from 1 to 150,
and from 1 to 30, and that the issue of the latter bonds was unauthorized and illegal. They call upon plaintiffs to show that they
are the owners of the bonds of the former class, which are'denominated as genuine. It appears from the proof, that the bonds held
by plaintiffs are a portion of the $150,000 subscribed as stock to
the company, and that those constituting the $30,000 are clearly
distinguishable, by their numbers, from those issued for the subscription.
The plaintiffs produce the bonds with the guarantee of the railroad company, signed by their president and countersigned by their
secretary; and they must, therefore, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be regarded as the owners.
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The defendants, in their 4th division, lay their greatest stress,
and construct the most elaborate argument upon the ground that
the Mayor of the city of Maysville did not unite in ordering the
vote of the city, as to the propriety of taking the stock and in passing the order for the subscription-that he did not make the subscription, and was not consulted by and united with the city council in determining how said subscription should be paid by the
city. In enforcing this position, they quote various portions of the
charters of the city, and of the Maysville and Lexington Railroad
Company.
This argument, which seems to be the main reliance of defendants, is founded upon the mistaken principle of construction, that
a magnified effect must be given to one general proviso of section
28 of the charter of the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company, which refers to the subscriptions of the counties of Mason,
Nicholas, Bourbon and Fayette, and the cities of Maysville and
Lexington, and any other city or county or corporation, at the same
time denying any effect whatever to another, and the last proviso
of the same section, which refers particularly and only to the subscription of the city of Maysville. This mere statement of the
premises on which the argument is founded, will at once satisfy a
logical mind that the conclusion must be fallacious and erroneous.
But, to notice the error more particularly, it will be necessary to
quote the entire section, which is as follows :
"Sec. 28. That the cities of Maysville and Lexington, and the
counties of Mason, Nicholas, Bourbon and Fayette, and any other
city, county or corporation, be and they are hereby permitted to hold
stock in the corporation created by this act, upon the same terms,
on the same conditions, and subject to the same restrictions with
other stockholders: Provided, the amount by said several cities,
counties and corporations, separately subscribed, shall not, in any
single instance, exceed the following sums: by Maysville, one hundred and fifty thousand dollars; by Lexington, one hundred and
fifty thousand dollars; by Maysville and Mason county, jointly,
one hundred and fifty thousand dollars; by Nicholas county, one
hundred thousand dollars; by Bourbon county, one hundred and

GRAHAM ET AL. vs. MADDOX ET AL.

fifty thousand dollars; by Fayette county, two hundred thousand
dollars; and by any other city, county or corporation, any sum not
exceeding the largest amount aforementioned; and it shall be lawful for the president and directors of said company, after giving six
weeks notice thereof, by advertisement in the papers of the said
several cities and counties, wherein a vote shall be proposed, (or if
there be no paper printed in any county in which a vote shall be
proposed, then in such paper as may have a general circulation in
such county,) upon a day named in said advertisement, to take the
sense of the qualified voters of said cities and counties, or any one
or more of them, as to the policy of said cities and counties, or any
one or more of them, becoming subscribers to the stock in said railroad company, to any amount which may have been proposed in
said printed notice, not exceeding the respective sums above specified; and it shall be the duty of the Mayor and council of each of
the cities of Maysville and Lexington, and of the county courts
of the several counties, upon the day named in said printed notice,
to open columns in the various precincts of said cities and counties,
and take all necessary measures for correctly ascertaining the sense
of the qualified voters of their respective cities and counties, at the
polls thereof, as aforesaid; and provided a majority of all the qualified voters of any of said cities or counties, who shall have cast'their
votes at said election, shall be in favor of the said several subscriptions of stock, as proposed, to such city or county, it shall be the
duty of the Mayor and council of every such city to pass an ordinance directing the Mayor, on behalf of such city, to subscribe for
any amount of stock provided for in said ordinance, not exceeding
the sum specified in said printed notice; and it shall be the duty of
the county court of every such county, in like manner, to empower
and direct their clerk to subscribe for the amount of stock authorized by the voters of said county, not exceeding the sum specified
in said printed notice; and it shall be lawful for said cities and
counties so aufhorizing subscriptions to the capital stock of said company, to raise the amount of their separate subscriptions, as the
same shall be called by the president and directors of said road, by
a tax on the real and personal estate of the said several cities and
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counties subscribing, or by borrowing the amount thereof, payable
in the way and on the terms the said several Mayors and councils,
and the said several county courts may deem most advisable; and
the interest on all such sums borrowed may be provided for in such
manner as to them seems best: Provided,that all taxes laid by any
city or county to pay the principal and interest (or either) of the
amounts borrowed by them, shall be pledged and sacredly appropriated to such purpose, and no other : And provided, that all sums
paid by any citizen of said cities or counties on account of the several subscriptions of any city or county, or in payment of the interest
upon any such subscription, shall entitle him to a certificate for the
amount thereof ; and when said certificates amount to fifty dollars,
shall entitle him to one share in the stock subscribed by his said
city or county, for every fifty dollars so held by him; Provided
further, that the city council for the city of Maysville may, at any
time after the passage of this act, on giving three weeks notice
thereof in the newspapers printed in said city, cause a poll to be
opened in the three wards of the city, and the sense of the voters
taken as to the propriety of said city subscribing to the capital stock
of said-road, as provided in this charter; and if a majority of those
voting are in favor, it shall be the duty of the board of council to
subscribe the number of shares provided for in this charter, so soon
as books shall be opened."
It will be perceived that the enacting clause or body of the section is very short, and simply authorizes the subscription of stock
by certain cities and counties by name, and others generally, upon
the same terms and on the same conditions, and subject to the same
restrictions with other stockholders. If it ended here, no vote would
have been necessary, and the limit of the subscriptions would have
been subject to the discretion of the authorities of the respective
cities and counties. But it is followed by a proviso, limiting the
amount of the subscription of each city and county, and which
requires a vote previous to a subscription by city or county. That
proviso authorizes the president and directors of the company to
select the time for the polls to be opened in the said several cities
and counties. It requires them to give a notice of siz weeks before
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said election shall be held. And it further requires the mayor and
council of each of said cities of Maysville and Lexington, on the
day named by the president and directors in the printed notice, to
open columns in the several precincts for said elections, and to take
all necessary measures for correctly ascertaining the sense of the
qualified voters. And if a majority vote in favor of the subscription, it is made the duty of the mayor and council to pass an ordinance directing the subscription by the mayor.
The object of a proviso being to limit or restrict the force of the
body of the statute or impose conditions on its general operation,
were it left to this proviso alone, it would appear that the subscription authorized by the body of the section must have been made in
the manner directed by the said proviso, and there might be some
force in the argumentative pleading of defendants. But the whole
section concludes with a very different proviso, showing plainly that
it was intended, as far as it applied, to be an alteration or modification of the first proviso.
The first proviso referring to Maysville and Lexington and the
counties named, and any other cities or counties, authorizes the
president and directors of the railroad company to fix the time of
the vote. This last proviso, commencing with the significant words
"provided further," and referring only to Maysville, authorizes
the city council to fix the time of voting in said city. The first proviso requires a notice of six weeks. The last proviso requires a
notice of only three weeks. The first proviso, referring to Lexington as well as Maysville, whose charter may be different in this
respect from Maysville, and to other cities, say Frankfort or Louisville, or both, who might become interested in taking stock in the
road, and whose charters may be similar to that of Lexington,
requires the mayor and council to order the vote. This last proviso,
referring to Maysville alone, (whose council by its charter has the
sole power of legislation for the city,) authorizes the city council
to order the vote. The first proviso, referring still to all said
cities, makes it the duty of the mayor and council to pass an ordinance directing the mayor to subscribe. This last proviso referring alone to Maysville, makes it the duty of the board of council to
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subscribe the number of shares provided for in the charter, so soon
as books shall be opened.
Now, can there be a moment's hesitation or doubt in any rational
mind as to which proviso is to control the proceedings in reference
to the vote and subscription in Maysville-the one which alludes to
several cities and counties, or the one which alludes to Maysville
alone, and which was manifestly intended to govern its proceedings?
Both provisoes were intended, so far as applicable, to regulate
the manner of the subscription. Each must have force. And the
last proviso can have no force unless the particulars in which it
differs from the first proviso are to prevail. The only object of
it was to modify or alter the first proviso in four particulars in
their application to Maysville. If that is not done, the last proviso is entirely nugatory, and must be stricken from the section.
If it is done, the enacting clause and the first proviso will have
all the efficacy intended for them, and the whole section will be
consistent and harmonious.
There can be no doubt that the city council was to appoibb the
time and give the notice of the vote in Maysville as they didand that the president and directors of the company were to
appoint the time and give the notice of the vote in the other
cities and counties, as they did, when votes were taken. It is
clear that the notice in the counties and in Lexington and other
cities, was to be six weeks, aud that in Maysville it was to be
three. It is equally clear that in Lexington the mayor and council
should have opened the polls, and ordered the mayor to subscribe,
and that in Maysville the board of council alone was to order the
vote, and themselves to make the subscription.
The vote and proceedings in Maysville were strictly in accordance with this last proviso, as they were clearly designed by the
charter to be. Had the proviso so much relied upon by defendants, been even a portion of the body of the section, and this last
proviso the only proviso to it, the construction, where there is
such a marked and continued variance, would have been that the
proviso should control, and was designed to control, as to the substantial matters in which it so differed. But it being a proviso
89
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"further," as it is, and the last proviso, and specially applied to
Maysville, there cannot be the shadow of a doubt that it is to control
as to the mode of proceeding in Maysville.
But were it even doubtful (as it is not) as to whether the council,
or the mayor and council were to order and make the subscription, the question would arise as to the object of ordering and
and making the subscription. The object was the acquisition of
so much stock by the city of Maysville. According to the first proviso, after the vote was taken it was the duty of the mayor and
council to pass an ordinance directing the mayor to subscribe. It
was not a matter of discretion with them. The power of the vote
was controlling. The legislature made it mandatory on the mayor
and council then to subscribe. It thus beeame a mere ministerial
act as to them, admitting of no hesitation or exercise of discretion. The purpose was that the city should positively takc and
become the holder of so much stock in said company on the vote
being in favor of it; and as the act of taking thus became ministerial, if it was done, though not in the exact mode pointed out by
the statute, as the end and purpose of the statute were accomplished there could be no objection. In this case the essential matter was the vote, under the call, direction and final inspection of
the authorities pointed out by the charter; and as the last proviso indubitably took the power of calling for the vote and fixing
the time for it from the company and vested it in the city council,
and took the power from the mayor and council to order the vote
and vested it in the council, and as these provisions of the law were
complied with, and the vote resulted in favor of the subscription,
the law then required the subscription to be made, and the making
of it could have been enforced by appropriate proceedings.
It being a ministerial act, and the acquisition of the stock being
the object of it, and the commissioners having received the subscription as made, and the company recognizing the ownership by
the city of the stock, and receiving therefor the bonds of the city,
which expressly specify that they are given in payment of so much
stock, and they having been received as such by the company, and
negotiated and sold, it is plain that the city thus became a stockholder
in the road, whether the mere ministerial act (after the vote) of
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ordering and taking the stock was made by the council, or mayor
and council-and as the acquisition of the stock was the object of
ordering and making the subscription, there now can be no objection to the mere mode. This view is not forbidden by the decision
in the case of the County Court of Payette vs. Lexington and Big
Sandy Railroad Company, 17th B. Monroe, 338; because the
question there turned upon the legality of the call of the vote by
the county judge, in vacation, when the law required that it should
be done by the county court, and upon the validity or invalidity of
the vote thus called. In the case of the Covington and Lexinyton
Railroad Company vs. The Kenton County Court, 12th B. Monroe, 144, the proposition for a subscription or tax, was submitted to
the people without specifying the amount, and thus the efficacy of
the vote was lost. In both of the foregoing cases, the writ of mandamus was applied for to compel the subscription. It seems not to
have been questioned that the subscription would have been ordered
if the vote had been legal, or that the mandamus was the proper
means of enforcing it. As in this case the vote was ordered, and
taken in conformity with the statute, the subscription consequent
thereupon, was enforceable, and the stock being held by the city,
there can be no objection to the manner in which the subscription
was made.
In the case of the Justices of Clark County vs. MJre Paris,
Winchester, and Kentucky River Turnpike Road Company, 11th
B. Monroe, 143, under a charter somewhat similar to this, it was
decided that the provisions requiring the stock to be subscribed in
a book for the purpose, according to the form of the statute, was
only intended to apply to individuals, and that as to the county, the
order on its records subscribing the stock, was the real subscription by the county court, and imposed the obligation on the court,
if accepted by the company. The same principles apply to the
city. The order in council was its subscription. It was obligatory
on the city, and the formal act of placing it on the books of the
company, conferred no additional obligation, and owed all its efficacy to the order of record. So even if it be conceded that the
mayor should have made the subscription in the books of the commissioners or company, the fact that he did not do so, did not in-
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validate the subscription as made, when accepted by the company,
as really the order of council made of record, -was the subscription, and it was binding without an entry in the books of the company.
But in adjudicating any question, it is the part of judicial duty
to look at the working of the principle either way. Suppose that
the facts as to the subscription had been just as they are, with this
difference, that the road, instead of being a failure, had been finished,
and was paying regularly a dividend of eight or ten per cent., and
a voice in the control of it were a matter of considerable moment
to the city of Maysville, could it be pretended that the company,
or the balance of its stockholders, could by reason of any of these
informalities, now relied upon by defendants, have deprived her of
her stock, and her proper influence in the control of the road, after
she had passed her notes in payment of it? Such an attempt
would be pronounced an inexcusable outrage. A contract must
bind both parties; and as we can conceive of no mode by which
the company, in this state of the case, could relieve itself of the stock
of Maysville, so must the city of Maysville be considered a stockholder in the road, and her notes passed for such stock, as binding
on her.
In view of what clearly seems to be the fair construction o'f said
section 28, it is unnecessary for the court to examine the quotations
by defendants from the charter of the city of Maysville. Were it
requisite to do so, it -could be shown that such quotations are mere
general allusions to the powers of the mayor and council, without
discriminating as to the functions belonging to each, and that in the
division of powers, that which has been exercised in this instance
by the council, was within the scope of such powers and duties as
pertain to it under the charter. The whole charter shows this, and
that the duties of the mayor are of an entirely different character.
In any attitude, therefore, in which the case can be contemplated
the well-presented argument of defendants in reference to the mayor
being upon mistaken premises, can constitute no valid objection to
these bonds.
It may be further mentioned that the legislature, by an amendment to the charter of the railroad company, approved February
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4th, 1854, session acts, 1853-4, page 299, ratified and confirmed,
and declared legal and valid the subscriptions of stock previously
made by individuals, towns, and city corporations, and declared the
bonds previously issued negotiable and transferable, and made it
imperative on the council and other authorities, to levy and collect
a tax to pay the interest and principal; thus legalizing and making
obligatory the previous proceedings, so far as the legislature had
power so to do-concerning which it is not necessary now to inquire.
The fifth objection by defendants, is that the charter of the railroad company was so amended in 1851, as that bonds might be
executed in payment of stock instead of its being paid in cash,
which change imposed this debt on the city. But it will be seen
by reference to said 28th section of the original charter, that it was
lawful for the authorities of the city to raise the amount of the subscription by borrowing the amount thereof, payable in the way, and
on the terms the said authorities might deem most advisable. This
is, therefore, no substantial departure from the original charterindeed the original charter is more comprehensive, and admits of a
greater latitude of discretion in this respect than the amendment.
That the bonds were made payable to the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company, instead of to the president and directors of
said company, is an objection of mere form without substance. The
title and corporate name of the company was "The Maysville and
Lexington Railroad Company," and contracts should run in its corporate name. The president and directors governed it, and bonds
to the company were under their control. The amended charter,
doubtless through inadvertance, required them to be made payable
to the president and directors. - They were, however, the property
of the company, and that they were made payable to the company
cannot affect their validity.
The second subdivision of the fifth head of the answer, alleges that
they are void because the interest is made payable semi-annually in
New York, and that the amended charter provides that it shall
be due yearly, by reason of which difference, it is contended, the
city in the course of the thirty years which the bonds have to run,
will lose several thousand dollars in interest and exchange.
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The third subdivision of the same head pronounces the bonds void,
because the amended charter gives the right to pay the subscription in bonds, in such cities and counties as shall subscribe, which is
construed by defendants to apply only to those who should in future
subscribe, and as Maysville had previously subscribed, it is contended
that her bonds were executed without authority of law.
All these objections, ranged under the fifth head, are met by the
said decision in the case of Slack et al vs. The Maysville and
Lexington Railroad Company, 13th B. Monroe. It appears on
the 5th, 6th, Tth, 8th, and 20th pages of said volume that the
Appellate Court had in view and considered the amendment to the
charter, and the proceedings of the Mason county court in making
the bonds payable to the "company " in "New York," with interest payable "semi-annually."
The fact that Mason county had
subscribed "previous " to the amendment of the charter, was also
fully before them. These difficulties were alluded to in the dissenting opinion of Judge Hise, and they must have been the subject
matter of consultation and deliberation with the court previous to
its decision. The Mason county bonds were in terms precisely
similar to those of the city of Maysville, and the object of that suit
was to test their validity and the legality of the tax to pay them
and the interest on them. The court in express terms overruled
the foregoing objections, and sustained the validity of those bonds
and ordered the enforcement of the tax to pay the interest on them.
This was before their negotiation and sale to innocent third parties
for a valuable consideration. Such having been the judgment of
the Appellate Court in a case precisely analogous to this, it would
be inexcusable in the court to refuse to enforce these bonds when
third parties have bought them in good faith without notice of wrong
or of any thing to put them upon inquiry or excite their suspicion.
Their equity is based upon grounds which are always recognized as
unassailable in courts.
But for the foregoing decision it might be worthy of consideration whether it was proper under the charter to make the interest
on the bonds payable semi-annually. While it would not make void
the bonds, it might affect the question as to the amount of interest
and the time of its collection, if application should have been made
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to the court previous to their transfer. But since the council issued
such bonds with the knowledge and approbation of the citizens for
the purpose of sale, and they have been transferred without complaint on the part of those to be affected by such difference, it is
now too late to prejudice the rights of the holders by such objection.
Further, the charter authorizes the notes to be made payable at
such times as the council may deem most advisable. Would not
that provision authorize them to make the interest on the bonds
(being part of the bonds) payable at such times as they might deem
most advisable ? The portion of the charter requiring them to
levy and collect by tax an amount in money sufficient annually to
pay off the interest, is not necessarily inconsistent with this idea.
It requires the interest to be paid each year, but not necessarily at
the end of each year-part might be made payable in the middle
of the year, and part at the end of the year. And thus both provisions would be harmonized and yet each would have its intended
effect.
The validity of coupons-as bonds is not material here, because
the question is as to the validity of the bonds, and whether the
interest should be paid. That interest is evidenced by the bonds
themselves, and the coupons add no additional force to it. "They
are merely attached as convenient means of specifying the interest
due at each period, and being, when lifted, evidence of its payment.
The sixth objection of defendants cannot therefore be regarded,
because if it were conceded that the coupons are void as independent bonds, the interest which they evidence would still hive to be
provided for. Coupons for interest were attached to the Mason
county bonds, and alluded to by the Court of Appeals.
The eighth and ninth paragraphs of defendants' answer amount
to a plea of failure of consideration as to the city and the tax payers.
The avgrments are that the road has never been completed that the
company have forfeited their charter, and by gross mismanagement
have placed it out of their power to comply with their engagements
in this respect. As to the taxpayers it is alleged that by the
amended charter they were to obtain stock in consideration of taxes
paid to defray interest; but that the Railroad Company has forfeited
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its charter and disbanded, consented to a sale of its effects and
become utterly unable to comply with this part of its contract,
because it no longer holds any stock. This reliance upon the
amended charter seems to be at variance with the great body of
the answer which regards it as of no constitutional validity.
But can it be said that there is any failure of consideration? The
city received the payment for her bonds in the stock which she took
in the company. She became a stockholder, subject of course to
the same terms and conditions and liable to the same fortunes as
other stockholders. She took the stock subject to any depreciation
or loss which accident, misfortune or even mismanagement of the
railroad company (of which she was an influential member) might
produce.
.It cannot be admitted that she is more fortunate than any other
stockholder, and that it was her privilege to enjoy the benefit of
receiving the profits of the stock if the enterprise was successful,
and on the other hand to absolve herself of the bonds given in payment of her subscription, if it eventuated in a failure. The consideration of her bonds was the stock of the company, and if it has
become depreciated, or by the failure of the company it has been
entirely lost, such a casualty is one .of the incidents of the consideration. It could not be contended that there was any guarantee that
the consideration would be of perpetual value. There was nothing
in its nature to place it beyond the contingency of loss, occasioned
by the laws of trade, the diversion of business by rival lines or new
modes of communication or by a lack of prudent and economical
management by its officers. The city therefore took the consideration as a totality, subject to fluctuations for the better or worse, or
subject to its entire failure. The consideration itself was received.
What afterwards happened to it cannot invalidate the notes given
for it. Could an individual give his note to a joint stock company
or a partnership for stock, and thus become a stockholder and one
of the controllers of it-and that company should sell the note for
cash to enable it to prosecute its undertakings, and afterwards by
some mismanagement" should fail, could he then invalidate his note
for an alleged failure of consideration. The proposition will strike
any one at once as grossly fallacious. If it should prevail, the princi-
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ple of business would be that no man would be compelled to pay any
debts except those out of the consideration for which he made a
profit-if he ever made a loss the debt would be unobligatory.
The mistake of the argument is caused by misapprehending the
consideration. The consideration was not the promise or expected
completion of the road, or even such careful management as would
be likely to bring about that result. These may have been calculations which led the city to take the stock. But the consideration
for the bonds was the stock. The city thus obtained the stock and
the tax payers thus obtained their stock or the right to it, and each
would take it as any other stockholder. And the failure of the
company and the consequent worthlessness of its stock cannot impair
the obligation of the debt by taking away the means provided by
the the statute for payment. The law authorizing the subscription
could not and did not guarantee the permanent value of this stock
and enable counties and cities to practice a stupendous fraud on the
public by only requiring payment in case everything worked fairly
and smoothly, and by sanctioning repudiation if the undertaking was
unsuccessful.
The debt is worthless if it cannot be enforced, or if there are no
no means of payment. Taxation was the means provided by the
charter for its payment. If the tax-payers can be released from" the
payment of their taxes because the stock is of no value, then the
legal obligation of the debt is gone, the means specially appointed
by law for its liquidation are taken away, and we again fall back
on the principle that if a railroad fails to be completed, counties and
cities subscribing to it, are not bound to pay to third parties the
notes for the stock. The mistake of the argument as to individual
taxpayers is in again misapprehending the consideration. The consideration was not the certain assurance that they would always
receive stock for taxes; but the right so to receive it is as long as
there was a company or stock. Besides, according to the proof the
stock has never been denied them for taxes, and the right to receive
it has not been abrogated. But the stock has become worthless and
they have not applied for it, or it has been considered useless to
issue it. But let this be as it may, the Court of Appeals must be
presumed to have considered these consequences of such a provision
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in the charter and amended charter, and it cannot be supposed
that they intended to promulgate the legal doctrine that the bonds
and tax were only valid and binding on the city and the taxpayers,
if the company continued solvent and the stock valuable; but void
or voidable in case of the failure of the enterprise and the consequent
depreciation or entire loss in value of the stock.
The charter of the company, gave it power to borrow money to a
large amount and to pledge the property of the company for the
payment thereof. The city subscribed stock and the tax-payer
held his right to receive stock for taxes subject to this power, which
it seems was exercised. And if the property of the company with
or without consent was sold to pay borrowed money for which it was
mortgaged under the twenty-fourth section of the charter, neither
the city nor its tax-payers can be released thereby from the payment
of these bonds to the present holders.
There is no proof in the record, of deception and fraud practiced
on the people or the city. They in their zeal, probably overrated
the importance of the enterprise, and it seems certainly overrated
their means of achieving it. They calculated for success alone;
and being so sanguine and determined, in the anguish of their disappointment they think they ought not to pay. ]But they will, by
calm reflection and by being accustomed for a time to the loss, which
they have magnified and mourned over too much, sooner or later
become satisfied of their error.
In examining in detail the objections made by defendants to the
validity of these bonds, on account of the circumstances preceding
and attending their execution, the court has considered the matter
as though the present liability of the city and its tax-payers
depended upon the bonds having been originated and executed in
exact conformity with the charter. It is by no means certain that
this is a true view of the law applicable to the cases. These bonds
were negotiable, made so by the charter-they were actually made
payable to the company, assignees or bearer. The city and her
citizens were aware of this. The office of the company was here,
its books were subject to inspection. The order for the issue of
these bonds was known-their character and terms were matters of
publication and notoriety. It is placed in broad letters on the face
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of the bonds, that they are

"AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE OF

OF KENTUCKY-SANCTIONED

STATE

3Y VOTE OF THE PEOPLE."

They were issued a considerable period before they were actually
negotiated or sold. No objection was made to their terms or to
the issue or negotiation of them. No injunction was obtained to
prevent it. And the parties now complaining of them must in legal
contemplation be considered as having looked on and seen the innocent holders vest their money in the purchase of them, without
informing them of any circumstance calculated to affect their
validity or even put the purchasers on inquiry.
Under these circumstances, even if the charter has not been
strictly complied with in every particular, can such a fact be set up
with effect against these bona fide holders ? Will every objection
which would sustain an injunction against these bonds before their
negotiation, be good against an innocent purchaser for a valuable
consideration, under the circumstances attending the issue and sale
of these bonds? The court is of the opinion that it would not.
By their negotiation and sale an equity has arisen in behalf of the
holders, which will outweigh the objections caused by many formal
departures from the charter. The court recognizes the principle that a corporation must act within its charter. But it may
be asked, in the language of Justice McLean, of the United States
Supreme Court, in his able decision in the case of Zabriskie vs.
The Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati Railroad Company and
others, published in the Cincinnati Gazette, March 20th, 1858,"Is the doctrine maintainable that all who deal with a corporation
must look into its charter, not only to be assured that corporate
powers have been conferred upon it, but to see that every thing in
the exercise of a given power has been done in exact accordance
with the mode provided, especially when its acts are set forth in
general terms showing a compliance with the law ?" And the court
refers to that opinion, and the cases therein cited, as strong authority to sustain the position herein taken. Shall the bona fide purchasers of the bonds at their current value in the market, entirely
loose their investment, or shall the city of Maysville and its taxpayers pay these bonds, which they authorized to be issued, and
thrown into the market and sold for'their benefit, and received the
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consideration for ? It seems to the court that it is not a contest
between equities ; but it is a case of strong equity on one side and
decided obligation on the other. In any view which the court can
take of the subject, these bonds are valid, and however painful
it may be to the court to observe the inconveniences which their
enforcement will produce, there could be, with the view of the court,
no excuse for its failure to perform the duty resting upon it, whatever reasons may be deemed satisfactory by the citizens for their
failure to pay them.
It is necessary next to inquire whether plaintiffs have adopted
the proper remedy, or whether there is any thing in the circumstances, or the time selected for its enforcement, which prevents its
applicability.
The amended charter of the railroad company, session acts
1850-51, 2d vol. page 194, makes it the duty of the city council
to levy and collect, upon the real and personal property of the city,
an amount in money sufficient annually to pay off the interest on
said bonds. So far, then, as the question, whether this tax shall or
shall not be levied and collected, is concerned, the city council have
no discretion. The law is unmistakable in its terms. It is mandatory, and it is the duty of the councils to levy the tax-they are
the agents of the legislature in performing this duty. In this
respect they bear the same relation to the subject matter and to
the citizens, that the county court would, in reference to a similar
duty.
If the administration of the remedy should be governed by the
elementary authorities, or by the expositions of the law as contained
in judicial decisions in other States, the writ of mandamus would be
the only proper, because the only efficient, remedy. It may be conceded that according to such authorities the writ of mandamus
should never be issued when the plaintiffs have any other specific,
adequateremedy againstthe same defendants. Here they have no
such remedy. The ordinary actions of plaintiffs against the city
for the interest, have, pending this motion, been discontinued. But
were they still on the docket, they could afford the plaintiffs no
adequate relief. A judgment thereon could not be collected. The
city'as a corporation is insolvent. All its property and franchises
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are mortgaged for amounts beyond or at least equal to their value.
And the plaintiffs can only look to the revenues arising from taxation. A proceeding by suit would not be against the same defendants. A suit would be against the city alone. This is for
effect on the board of councilmen.
It is an extraordinary and summary remedy. But questions of
fact as well as of law can be adjudicated upon in such a proceeding
-and there is hardly axi instance in our State, or any other, wherea mandamus has been prayed for that it has not given rise to grave
constitutional or legal questions and questions of disputed fact which
it was necessary to determine. These are too numerous to require
a reference. If the doctrine was admitted that the writ was not
the proper remedy, and could not be issued in any case 'where the
rights of plaintiffs, which were the alleged basis of the motion, were
controverted, then the defendants could always defeat it by denying
the rights which it was intended to enforce.
The original charter evidently contemplated a tax as the means
of paying the interest as well as redeeming the principal of any
obligations arising from the subscription, and such a tax was made
"lawful " and its proceeds were required to be 1 pledged and sacredly
appropriated to such purpose and no other." The amendment not
only gave the power, but made it the duty of the council to "levy
and collect this tax. And without any voluminous references to
elementary authorities or to judicial decisions in other States, it
may be stated that our Appellate Court have by a number of decisions established mandamus as the proper remedy to enforce the.
performance by an inferior tribunal or officer, of a ministerial act
which he or it is bound by law to perform, and of which the refusal
defeats or violates the vested right of an individual recognized and
enforceable by law. Page, Second Auditor vs. .Hardin, 8th B.
Monroe, 651, and cases there cited- The Auditor vs. GreenAdams,
13th B. Monroe, 151. In the case of the Justices of Clark county
vs. The Paris, Winchester and Kentucky River Turnpike Comyany, 11th B. Monroe, page 154, it was decided to be "the appropriate and indeed only remedy for compelling the performance of"
such a duty as is required in this case. That was an application
to require the justices of Clark county to levy a tax to pay a sub-
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scription to the turnpike company. By the charter of the turnpike company, the county court was vested with power and authority to assess the amount of stock which it subscribed, upon all
property and estate subject to the payment of the State revenue
within the county. But it was not made obligatory on the said
court to do so. Yet the Circuit Court and Court of Appeals decided
that it was their duty to take proper measures for raising the money,
and that a mandamus requiring a levy of the tax was the appropriate and only remedy. If in such a case it was the only remedy,
certainly in this case, where the city council are not simply vested
with the power, but it is their duty to levy and collect the tax, mandamus must be the only remedy. It may be here remarked, that
Justice Hise, in his dissenting opinion in the case before referred to,
(wherein many if not all the defendants' objections to the subscription, bonds and tax are suggested,) remarks: "If the bonds be
valid, and if the subscription of $150,000 of stock be valid, then
the bond holders would have a lien upon all the taxable property
in Mason county and the city of Maysville, belonging to the inhabitants now or hereafter, to secure the payment of the principal and
interest. They could coerce the payment by suit, and thus compel,
by an appropriate legal proceeding, the county court to levy and
collect the requisite tax upon all the real and personal property of
the county to meet their demands." This, with his subsequent
remarks in the same connection, shows conclusively that it was his
opinion the levy and collection of the tax could be enforced by
mandamus. He goes so far as to say, "If required, the whole of
the hard earnings of the inhabitants must be swallowed up, and
even their estates reduced, if necessary, to pay the county (or city)
creditors." 13th B. Monroe, 73.
The proceeding in this State never has run in the name of the
commonwealth. But the application has been in the name of the
party interested, and no defendant was necessary but the body or
person upon whom the writ was to act. These principles were established by adjudications before the code of practice, and by it they
became statutory provisions. Page 147, chap. 13.
It is obtained on motion, after petition filed, and must be prosecuted as a summary proceeding. It is characterized as an order
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from a court of competent and original jurisdiction, commanding
an executive or ministerial officer to perform an act or omit to do
one, the performance or omission of which is enjoined by law, and
is granted on the motion of the party aggrieved, or-of the commonwealth when the public interest is affected. Who are the parties
aggrieved here ? The holders of t&ese bonds. The bonds are, by
the charter, negotiable and transferable, and they are actually made
payable to the company, assignee or bearer. The endorsement of
them is more properly a guarantee of their payment than an assignment. It is not technically the latter, but it shows that they have
been negotiated by the company, and expressly says -' for value
received." And plaintiffs are now the holders or "bearers," and
the right to the bonds and all rights incident to such ownership
are vested in them. The remedy can be applied for by them without making the railroad company a party. The legal fiction of the
railroad company may yet exist. The proof does not show that
there has been any formal proceeding for the forfeiture of its charter. Bat it has had no officers for several years, and is completely
disorganized. There is nothing of substance to represent it. Were
the railroad company still organized and acting, having a president
and directors, it would hardly be necessary to have it a party, since
the bonds are made payable to bearer, and have been negotiated by
the company, and are now held by others. But in the anomalous
condition of the railroad corporation, being as it is, simply a legal
fiction, and the court being of opinion that there is no set-off or
defence pleaded by defendants, which can be available .against
plaintiffs, it is considered that substantial justice can be done without requiring the technicality of bringing a lifeless corporation
before the court. Neither can-it be said that as the railroad company never formally assigned these bonds, and is now defunct, there
is now no rights in or remedy on them. They were acquired by
the plaintiffs before the failure of the company, and even if it should
be now considered dead, still the plaintiffs could not be debarred
from thbir rights previously acquired, by reason of the physical
impossibility of bringing a disorganized corporation before the
court.
Therefore, the motion and demurrer of defendants, founded upon
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the failure of plaintiffs to make the railroad
overruled.
The court has had more difficulty as to the
require plaintiffs to bring all the bondholders
it is conceived that a substantial right should

company a party, are
motion for a rule to
before the court. But
not be denied because

The holders of
of the failure to perform something impracticable.
the different bonds, making the aggregate of $150,000, are, it
appears, scattered all over this country, and some of them reside in
Europe. It would be impossible for the plaintiffs in any reasonable
time to learn their names and bring them all before the court, and
plaintiffs should not be denied their rights on that account. The
court has been doubtful whether the order should be for the levy of
a tax sufficient only to pay the interest on the bonds ($11,000) owned
by plaintiffs, or to pay the interest on the whole $150,000. It is
believed that if a tax should be levied to pay the interest -on only
$11,000, the plaintiffs would have no peculiar interest in its proceeds, although the levy should be required and made on their application. Because such tax would "be set apart, pledged and exclusively appropriated" to the payment of the interest on all the
bonds. They are all outstanding and unpaid, and each holder
would have an interest in the tax. Inasmuch, therefore, as plaintiffs' right to relief is involved with the rights of others, it would
be preferable to have such others joined with them. But as we
have seen that is impracticable, the provision of the Code of Practice, section 37, applies. The matter being one of common or general
interest of many persons, and the parties numerous, and it being
impracticable to bring them all before the court within a reasonable time, necessarily the suit or motion of plaintiffs, if not nominally brought for the benefit of all, must operate to the benefit
of all.
Plaintiffs can obtain no relief without its being so extensive as to
cover all; and the fact that it is so, and that all cannot be brought
before the court in a reasonable time, or do not come forward, cannot debar plaintiffs of their rights. This proceeding is not like a
suit for money (wherein the judgment would be for the payment of
the money to the parties entitled to it, thus rendering it necessary
that they should be parties,) but it is an application for an order to
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command the council to perform a legal duty. It can be made on
the application of any party aggrieved, whether he owns one
bond or the entire one hundred and fifty. Whether the holders of
these bonds are, in legal parlance, assignees or not, if they are the
owners of the bonds (as they are) they have a right to receive their
interest regularly; and, being aggrieved, they have a right to
apply to the proper court, without joining the railroad company or
other bondholders with them, for a writ of mandamus commanding
the council to perform the duty enjoined upon them by law in
respect to these bonds-that is, to levy and collect a tax each year,
to pay the interest on the whole of them. Wherefore the motion
for a rule to require all the bondholders to be brought before the
court is overruled.
The remedy is, then, moved for by proper parties. It is the proper remddy to enforce the levy. Is the exercise of the power of
the court required?
It appears from the original answer that a majority of the council of last year, who refused to levy and collect this tax, were elected for that purpose. They actually refused to levy and collect
it; because their passing the order for a levy, and afterwards
rescinding it and refusing to execute it, was equivalent to an original
refusal. The levy conferred no vested right, and without collection
was entirely inefficacious. The interest for July, 1857, and January, 1858, is unpaid, and no provision has been made for its payment. The fact alleged in the answers, that it has been customary
for the council heretofore to levy and collect the tax a year in advance of the coming due of the interest, (thus levying in f856 to
pay the interest of 1857) cannot have any influence to prevent a
mandamus now; because, if this was the custom, it seems a sufficiency was not levied, or, if levied, not collected, and the interest
was not paid. The interest is still in arrears, 'and the authorities
are in default, (whatever may have been their custom or the real
proprieties of the rule heretofore adopted by them) and it can be
corrected in no other effective way but by a mandamus to collect as
well as levy the tax. It will not do for the defendants to say there
has been no refusal to levy. They have refused, or, at least, have
failed to levy. They have not collected the money or paid the
40
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interest. And the object of this proceeding is to require them to
do it.
The majority of the council of 1857 had this motion for a mandamus continued, and it passed over, necessarily, to the present
April term of the court. In the meantime, by a regular election
under the charter of the city, the members of the council have
changed, and the present members of the council contend that no
mandamus should issue, because they are not yet in actual default.
But they acknowledge that they were elected to dispute the validity
of the debt, and to refuse to levy the tax, in 6rder to test the question. They adopt the answer of their predecessors of 1857. They
oppose the constitutionality of the subscription and tax, and are
determined not to levy or collect it. They do not array themselves
against the authorities of the country, and say they will not levy
and collect the tax if required; but they certainly have manifested
an-intention not to do it until they shall be required. This proceeding is intended to operate upon the council. The writ would be
directed to the council. The council is a perpetual body, though
its members may change; and that body being the authority
required by law to make this levy, has been in default as to the performance of this duty since a proper period for a levy in 1857.
The change in the membership does not alter the fact that the council has not yet performed that duty. The proceeding did not abate
by the change of some of the members of the council. In the present stage of the proceeding it was against them as members of the
council, (that is against the council) not as individuals, and the
change of membership may have rendered it necessary, as was done,
to renew the notice or serve it upon the new members ; but it would
not abate the proceeding.
Were the positions contended for by defendants in that particular
correct, how easy w6uld it be to baffle forever the creditors and prevent the enforcement of this duty. The circuit court meets in common law session but three times a year. If the proceeding should
be commenced at the spring term, the plea could be set up which is
now relied upon that there is yet no assessment for the present year.
At the summer term a continuance could be obtained on some sufficient showing, and the motion would pass over to the October term.
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The order would then be made for a levy, (with but little time for
collection) and before another term of the court, at which it could
be ascertained whether the order was complied with, new members
of the council would have come in at the regular January election,
and they could set up the plea that they should not be held responsible for the acts of their predecessors. The old members of the
council could say they were out of office, and had no power to make
the levy, and thus the matter would go on in one continual round
from year to year, and plaintiffs would b forever denied their rights.
Such cannot be the law or a correct practice. If the order should
be made at the July term, it could not probably be enforced until
the October term, and very soon after the proceedings could be
matured for enforcing it, the members would be out of office, and
thus the remedial measures would be exhausted before being made
effectual. It seems to the court, therefore, that the correct practice
is to regard the duty as one to be performed by the council as a
body-the body is the same from year to year, though the membership may change. To bring the body before the court it is necessary to have the process served on the members. But the default
of the council, in the performance of a duty in 1857, is still a default
of the council in 1858 ; and although the court could not and would
not attach or punish members of the council of 1858 for the default
of different members in 1857, yet the change of membership would
not alter the fact that the legal body or assembly or office was in
default, nor affect the powers of the court to require the duty to be
performed; and upon the failure of the body, after such requisition
of the court, it would be competent for the court to use such measures
against the individuals composing the body, to enforce the requisition, as the law provides.
The court cannot sustain the motion of the present defendants to
discontinue the motion as to Taylor, Stanton and Shackleford.
Although they, with Mr. Frank, voted for the levy of the tax, yet
they as members of the council were proper and necessary parties
at the time this proceeding was instituted. It being a proceeding
against the council, the members should be served with the notice,
and the fact that they were willing to levy the tax without a requi.
sition of the court, did not render it improper to make them as
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members of the Board of Councilmen, parties. Their willingness
to levy would relieve them from the effect of any coercive measures
of the court to enforce the requisition. The motion of defendants
is based upon the mistaken idea that this proceeding to obtain a
requisition from the court on the council to levy, is equivalent to a
proceeding against individual members of the council to enforce the
order in case of the refusal of any of them to comply with it. The
first runs against the council, and all its members should be parties;
the second would be only against the members who declined or
refused to obey the order of the court. They were therefore proper
and necessary parties, and their answer was proper. Their position
as parties and their answer as such are necessary to preserve a
correct history of the case. And While no remedy is now sought or
would be proper against them, it would be just as erroneous to enter
an order of discontinuance, and strike out their answer, as it would
be to enter a discontinuance, and strike out the answer of an individual party to a suit who had died. For they are civiliter mortuus
as councilmen; and it was only in that capacity they were made
defendapnts.
Wherefore the motion, not of themselves or of plaintiffs, but of
other defendants to discontinue as to them and to strike their
answer from the record, is overruled.
For reasons apparent in the foregoing portions of this opinion,
the court overrules the motion to dismiss or file away the original
petition. It is still pending, though from the change of councilmen
a change of names may have been proper for the purpose of due
notice to that body as a board.
For the same reasons, the motion to reject the amended petition
is overruled. The original motion was not dead, and it was not
necessary for plaintiffs to commence de novo. The demurrer to the
original and amended petition is overruled.
It is not practicable or necessary to bring all the tax payers of
the city of Maysville before the court, and the motion of defendant
Campbell to require it to be done is overruled. No relief against
them is asked, and although they may be consequentially affected by
the proceeding, yet they are no more necessary parties than in any
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suit by or against the city by which money might be brought into
or taken out of the treasury.
From the reasons given by the court in this opinion, it will be
perceived that some of the objections of defendants are overruled as
a matter of law, and some of them upon the proof. This will
explain the rulings of the court on the demurrers of plaintiffs to the
answers. Their demurrer to the 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 10th, 12th,15th
and 36th paragraphs of defendants' original answer is sustained,
and to the 7th, 9th and 13th is overruled. Their demurrer to the
1st paragraph of the answer to the amended petition is sustainedthe 2d paragraph is a demurrer. The 3d paragraph or division contains d variety of matter, some of which is demurrable, and some
not. As it contains some good matter a general demurrer is overruled. The demurrer does not go into and specify the subdivisions
of it, nor are they marked so as to be identified. But they rely
mainly on the same ground as the original answer, and the rulings
of the court on the demurrers thereto and the principles contained
in this opinion sufficiently indicate the views of the court on the
points raised in the answer to. the amended petition, which for the
reasons before given cannot be more particularly applied to its subdivisions.
It may be inconvenient for the people of the city now to pay this
tax. They may view it as a hardship. It may be considered burdensome. This may excite the sympathy of the court in behalf of
those who are to labor under this burden. But the question for the
court to try and determine is not whether it was politic to contract
this debt, not whether the railroad was properly managed, not
whether the people were or were not disappointed in the result of
the enterprise, to promote which the debt was contracted, nor
whether, owing to the depreciation of property and the decrease of
population, business and prosperity, it will work hardly on the people to pay it. But the court is called upon, by a proper legal
application, to decide whether the debt is a just, legal and binding
obligation on the city, and to exercise such power as is proper,
under the law, to enforce it.
The court has examined, with great care, all the grounds of
defence, and after mature deliberation, is satisfied that none of them
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are available; and that it is its solemn duty, under the law, to
award the writ of mandamus prayed for by plaintiffs. The constant
payment of this tax may pass the city and citizens through a long
and trying ordeal; but it is one through which the zeal and energy
manifested by them in the beginning of the railroad undertaking
will bring them in safety. And if true to their faith, which is
their highest interest, they will ultimately emerge from its gloom
and trouble, sobered, it may be, but ennobled and benefited by
the sacrifices which the redemption of their obligations demanded.
The city is now in arrears for the interest due ruly 1st, 1857,
and January 1st, 1858. From the proof it appears that the failure
to levy the tax in 1857 necessarily produced a deficiency in July,
1857, and the failure to pay the interest then due, and also that
due January 1st, 1858. It was therefore the duty of the Council
of 1857 to levy and collect in that year what was necessary to pay
said instalments. The Council thus far have failed to perform that
duty. They do not manifest a determination to resist the law; on
the contrary, they announce their intention to abide by the law,
but insist that the bonds are invalid and the tax illegal, and desire
the judgment of the court thereon. The court has given its judgment, and must now proceed to enforce it. The tax will have to
be levied and collected upon the real and personal property of the
city, as assessed for taxation for State purposes; because that is
expressly required by the amended charter of 1851, section 2d,
and also the act of amendment and consolidation of 1854, sec. 5th.
The levy and collection must be on the assessment for 1857.
The proceeding is to obtain the taxes which should have been levied
and collected in that year. The property assessed in that year
must bear the taxation of that year. It would operate unjustly and
unequally to throw the taxation of 1857 upon the property assessed
in 1858. It may be that the taxation, owing to deaths, removals,
and. other contingencies, cannot in some instances be now so easily
collected as it could have been in 1857. Still that does not alter
the legal principle. The object of this writ is to obtain the performance of a duty which should have been done in 1857, and that
duty is to levy and collect in money on the assessment of 1857, for
State purposes, of the real and personal property of the city of
Maysville, a sufficient amount of tax to pay one year's interest on
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the bonds of $150,000, issued to the Railroad Company in payment
of its subscription of stock. It is not necessary, therefore, to await
the assessment of 1858. The order can be made now.
ORDER.-Wherefore, the parties having been fully heard, and the
court being sufficiently advised, it is adjudged and ordered by the court
that the Board of Councilmen of the city of Maysville, composed
of Jonathan R. Paddock, Thaddeus C. Campbell, George W. Orr,
James F. Willett, William H. McGranahan, Simon Nelson, Alexander Maddox, Franklin M'Clanahan, and William W. Lamar, defendants to this motion, and duly before the court by service of the
notice herein, be and they are hereby commanded and required to
levy and collect, upon the real and personal property of the city of
Maysville, as assessed for taxation for State purposes in the year
1857, an amount in money sufficient, after making a reasonable
allowance for delinquencies, and the allowance directed by law as
compensation for the collecting officer, to pay one year's interest on
the bonds amounting to $150,000, issued by the said city of Maysville to the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company, in payment
of its subscription of stock of that amount to said company, including those of said bonds amounting to $6,000, held by plaintiff,
Win. A. Graham, and those of said bonds amounting to $5,000,
held by plaintiff, Eliza IC. Knox; that is to say, to pay the inistalment of interest due on all of said bonds on the first day of July,
1857, and on the first day of January, 1.858. The said levy and
collection shall be made in pursuance of and according to the charter
of the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company, and the amendments thereto. And the said taxes shall be collected in money,
and set apart, pledged and exclusively appropriated to the purpose
hereinbefore directed, and for no other purpose whatever. The
said defendants will apply said taxes so collected in money, to the
payment of the said instalments of interest due on said bonds, as
and in the manner directed by the said charter and the amendments thereto, including the said instalments of interest due to
plaintiffs.
This order is made returnable on Friday, the 29th day of the
present term, at which time the defendants will certify to the court
how they have obeyed this command; and the clerk is directed to
certify this order to said Board of Council.

